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Abstract—This paper presents an approach for side channel
cryptanalysis with iterative approximate Bayesian inference,
based on sequential decoding methods. Reliability information
about subkey hypotheses is generated in the form of likelihoods,
and sets of subkey hypothesis likelihoods are optimally combined
into key bit log likelihood ratios. The redundancy of expanded
keys in multi-round cryptographic schemes is exploited to correct
round key estimation errors. This is achieved by sequential decod-
ing, where subkey candidates are sorted by a probabilistic path
metric and iteratively extended. The M-algorithm is presented
as a concrete implementation example with deterministic run-
time behaviour. The resulting algorithm contains previous hard
decision differential analysis as special case for single-round
analysis and M=1, and is strictly more accurate otherwise. The
trade-off between estimation accuracy and complexity is scalable
by parameter choice. The proposed algorithm is simulatively
shown in an example scenario to reduce the number of required
side channel traces compared to standard differential analysis
by a factor of two when run with reasonable complexity, for the
whole investigated signal-to-noise ratio range.
Index Terms—side channel analysis, sequential decoding, dif-
ferential analysis, Bayesian inference, M-algorithm, cryptanalysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Side channel analysis is used to infer secret keys of
cryptographic systems from measurements of some physical
processing leakage, especially power consumption and elec-
tromagnetic radiation. Analysis methods are categorized into
’simple’ and differential methods. ’Simple’ analysis directly
classifies measured side channel traces, e.g. simple power
analysis (SPA) and simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA).
Differential methods like differential power analysis (DPA)
and differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) use a-priori
knowledge about a subkey dependency of some intermediate
processing result [1], [2], [3]. This a-priori knowledge is
commonly described as differential analysis selection function,
which describes the dependence of an information leaking
variable on a few key and data bits. Data bits in this re-
spect may be cyphertext bits when analyzing decryption or
alternatively plain text bits when analyzing encryption. The
standard method for differential analysis is to partition the
traces according to a subkey hypothesis and the selection
function, and to perform a difference-of-means test with a
side channel leakage model. The most common model for
power consumption and electromagnetic radiation (which is
proportional to the derivative of power consumption) is the
Hamming distance model, i.e. to assume differential side
channel leakage proportional to the number of switching bits
on a bus [4]. The number of subkey bits in the selection
function must be small enough to allow for enumeration: all
possible subkey hypotheses are tested in turn, and the most
likely one is chosen as estimation result. A detailed description
of the standard differential analysis algorithm and comparison
with several variations is given e.g. in [5].
The main motivation of this paper is the following: many
block cyphers like DES [6] and AES [7] are based on a multi-
round scheme, where the key is expanded into the round keys
according to a standardized key schedule. The key expansion
can in fact be seen as a block code, with a code rate of
1/R for a scheme with R rounds. This redundancy can in
principle be exploited for soft-decision error correction in the
side channel based key estimation. The optimality criterion is
maximum likelihood sequence estimation (MLSE), i.e. to find
or approximate the most likely valid expanded key. The idea
faces two obstacles, for which this paper proposes solutions.
First, the set of possible round keys is by design too large
for an enumeration. The presented approach generates key bit
log-likelihood-ratios (LLRs) from differential analysis, which
allows to sort the key space according to reliability and to
perform an informed search by only visiting a comparatively
small number of candidate key sequences. Second, to follow
the decryption (or encyption analogical) over several rounds,
either the available cyphertext has to be conditionally de-
crypted after each round based on a round key sequence
hypothesis, or equivalently the selection function could be
adapted. This paper uses sequential decoding [8], [9], [10] to
sort round key sequence hypotheses with a path metric, and
to iteratively expand the most likely candidates.
Sequential decoding methods are common knowledge in
communication theory and especially applied to multiple input
multiple output (MIMO) demapping and decoding of concate-
nated channel codes (e.g. [11] and the references therein).
The underlying problem is also to probabilistically and iter-
atively combine soft information from different sources. The
contribution of this paper is therefore to apply these well-
known methods from the area of communications to the area
of side channel cryptanalysis. The result is a characterization
of the three-dimensional trade-off between the number of
required side channel traces, the measurement signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) and the applied computational effort.
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Fig. 1. Overview of variable dependencies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
next section describes the system model and notation, Sec. III
shortly reviews standard single-bit differential analysis. The
proposed algorithm is presented in detail in Sec. IV including
key bit LLR generation, sequential decoding and multi-round
soft information combining. The complexity of this algorithm
in dependence on parameter choices is evaluated in Sec. V.
The accuracy of the estimation is simulatively evaluated and
compared to the standard hard-decision differential analysis in
Sec. VI for different SNR values. The last section discusses the
results and possible modifications of the presented approach.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
Vectors are denoted in bold font. The expectation operator
is denoted E[·], variance as V[·] and probability as P(·). A
multi-round cryptographic scheme with R rounds is assumed.
The expanded key is written as
k = (k1 . . . kR) , (1)
with the round keys ki, i = 1 . . . R. Each round key consists
of NB bits.
A. Sensitive variables and selection function for differential
analysis
Differential analysis requires a-priori knowledge about at
least one sensitive intermediate variable, which leaks infor-
mation through the side channel [1]. A typical example are
byte-wise S-box lookups for substitution in a substitution-
permutation network like AES [4]. The selection function
depends on the specific cryptographic algorithm, and also on
implementation aspects like e.g. the usage of masking [12].
The sensitive variable is denoted v = (v1 . . . vNV ), and the
selection function G:
v = G(d,kS) (2)
v depends on the subkey kS which comprises several bits of
the round key ki, and on some data bits d. The length (number
of bits) of the subkey is left variable at this point.
B. Power consumption model and feature extraction
The power consumption of digital devices depends on
their transistor switching activity. The two most common
power consumption models for side channel analysis are the
Hamming weight model and the Hamming distance model [4].
Their applicability depends on the implementation technology
of the device under test.
1) Hamming weight model: This model assumes a dif-
ferential current proportional to the number of positive bits
on a bus (i.e. the Hamming weight). It is applicable for
devices implemented in precharge logic [4]. The differential
side channel leakage l(t) of the sensitive variable under this
model is:
l(t) =
NV∑
i=1
vi(t) (3)
2) Hamming distance model: The Hamming distance
model assumes that the switching of bits on a bus consumes an
amount of current proportional to the number of switching bits
(i.e. the Hamming distance of consecutive words on the bus).
This model is applicable for devices implemented in CMOS
logic. The side channel leakage of the sensitive variable (e.g.
at transfer to/from a register) thus depends on the previous
word on the bus.
a) Device using software implementation:: If the crypto-
graphic algorithm is implemented in software, the assumption
can be made that the sensitive variable is handled at a fixed
point in the program. Then a constant but unknown previous
bus state r can be assumed [13]. The differential leakage
becomes:
l(t) =
NV∑
i=1
(
vi(t)⊕ ri
)
(4)
with ⊕ denoting the XOR operator. [13] proposes to assume
all possible reference states r and to use the most likely one,
computed as highest correlation factor.
b) Device using hardware implementation:: If the cryp-
tographic algorithm is implemented in hardware, it might
be assumed that consecutive values of the sensitive variable
are stored consecutively in the same register. The differential
leakage then becomes:
l(t) =
NV∑
i=1
(
vi(t)⊕ vi(t− 1)
)
(5)
c) Comparison:: a generalized power model comprising
both the Hamming weight and the Hamming distance model
with arbitrary parameters is obtained by conceptually assum-
ing a convolutional code C over the sensitive variable on the
word level (with 0 or 1 tap delay in the presented examples):
l(t) =
NV∑
i=1
C(v(t),v(t − 1)) (6)
With respect to the key bits kS , the resulting differential
leakage
l(t) =
NV∑
i=1
C
(
G(d(t),kS(t)), G(d(t − 1),kS(t− 1))
)
(7)
can be seen as a short block code concatenated with a short
convolutional code (for decoding of concatenated codes see
e.g. [14], [15], [10]). Unknown code parameters need to be
known a-priori, guessed or estimated.
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Fig. 2. Differential analysis: conditional densities of received amplitude and
mean estimation functions for 500 traces at SNR=6dB.
3) Feature extraction: Side channel measurements usually
use oversampling with respect to the clock of the device
under test, especially when measuring an electromagnetic
side channel. Measurements y use the clock τ , as compared
to the device using clock t. Since the device’s switching
power is of interest, and because power is proportional to the
squared amplitude of voltage or current (or the related fields
respectively), the received energy during one target clock cycle
may be extracted as feature:
f(t) = |y(t)|2 =
NS∑
τ=1
|y(t, τ)|2 , (8)
where NS is chosen to capture the clock’s rising edge half
period where the information transfer happens.
4) Assumption for simulations in this paper: For the sake
of clarity of the presentation, with the focus lying on key bit
LLR generation and multi-round soft information combining,
the Hamming weight model, Eq. (3), is assumed. As discussed,
a Hamming distance model could be reduced to the Hamming
weight model by assuming a serially concatenated short con-
volutional code over the sensitive variable. Additive noise n(t)
on the measurements caused by the measurement equipment
itself (like thermal noise of the receive amplifier) as well as
environmental noise and interference from other switching ac-
tivity in the circuit is assumed independent from the sensitive
variable. Simulations in this paper assume therefore:
y(t) = l(t) + n(t) , (9)
with the SNR:
γ =
V[l]
V[n]
=
σ2l
σ2n
(10)
A diagram of the variable dependencies is shown in Fig. 1.
III. REVIEW OF STANDARD SINGLE-BIT DIFFERENTIAL
ANALYSIS
The power dissipation of indidivual switching bits is too
small to be recognizable with ’simple’ analysis. Fig. 2 shows
the (simulated) distribution of received amplitudes, condi-
tioned on one bit vi being 1 or 0 respectively, i.e. P(y|vi = 1)
and P(y|vi = 0). The figure shows almost identical conditional
distributions at 6dB SNR.
As ’standard’ single-bit differential analysis it is referred to
[1], [2], [3]. With the known selection function and a subkey
hypothesis kS , the trace data can be partitioned according to
the value of one vi. For this subkey hypothesis, the difference
of means over the disjoint trace set partitions is computed:
PD = ET [f |vi = 1]− ET [f |vi = −1] (11)
For an incorrect subkey hypothesis, the expected result is zero.
For a correct subkey hypothesis, a nonzero value correspond-
ing to the bit’s switching energy is expected. Independent noise
is averaged away by the expectancy over the trace partitions.
The limit for an increasing number of traces NT is:
lim
NT→∞
PD =
{
ǫ if kS correct,
0 else (12)
with ǫ being the received switching energy. The subkey is
estimated by testing all hypotheses and choosing the one with
highest difference of means, corresponding to the maximum
likelihood (ML) subkey.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The proposed algorithm is an approximative maximum like-
lihood sequence estimation (MLSE), where the accuracy can
be scaled by the invested computational effort. A difference
to the standard differential analysis algorithm is that not only
the most likely subkey hypothesis is used, which would mean
a premature quantization of an intermediate result, but that all
tested hypotheses are used and optimally combined using a
probabilistic formulation. This probabilistic formulation also
allows for combination of different selection function. For
stochastic inference, key bits are modelled as independent
random variables. Their probability distribution functions are
computed from partial problems, and iteratively updated ac-
cording to Bayes’ theorem whenever an additional problem
constraint or information source is joined (Bayesian network,
Belief propagation [16]). Quantization of key bit probabilities
into binary values is done only at the end of the algorithm, to
avoid error propagation. Since the key search space even in one
round is by design for too large to consider all possibilities, an
informed graph search is used which avoids looking at most
possible key values. This is enabled by iterative sorting of
likelihoods of parts the joint solution and pruning the search
tree.
A. Problem structure: factorize expanded key probabiltiy den-
sity function
The joint probability density function of all random vari-
ables is factorized using conditional probabilities and Bayes’
theorem, to break down the estimation problem into smaller
components, which can be treated with limited computational
effort. This complexity reduction compared to joint estimation
exploits conditional independencies between variables [16].
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Fig. 3. Subkey likelihood generation from estimation function of means:
Gaussian tail probability (shaded).
For denotational as well as for computational convenience,
bit values are denoted as {−1,+1} in the following, instead
of the normal {0, 1}. Factorizing the expanded key estimation
problem into the round key estimation problems is:
P(ki...1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior probability
= P(ki|ki−1 . . .k1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
· P(ki−1...1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior probability
(13)
where ki...1 is the sequence of round keys ki downto k1.
Bayesian updating can then be applied iteratively over the
rounds. The formulation with conditional probabilities turns
the problem into a tree code model, where a graph search can
be run for the ’correct’, i.e. the most likely leaf. The sequential
decoding approach offers several implementation algorithms,
among them the stack algorithm [8], the M-algorithm [17]
and the T-algorithm [18]. The stack algorithm corresponds to
a depth first search, while the M-algorithm and T-algorithm
correspond to a breadth first search, where the number of
extended ’most likely’ nodes per level is limited (constant for
the M-algorithm and variable for the T-algorithm).
B. Generate soft information: key bit log-likelihood ratios
Log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) are a convenient way to ex-
press a key bit’s distribution function in one number. Another
advantage of computations in the log domain is that multi-
plications necessary to compute the probability of a sequence
of independent bits are effectively turned into additions. The
LLR of a bit b is:
L(b) = log
P(b = 1)
P(b = −1) (14)
and the inverse:
P(b = ±1) = e
±L(b)/2
e+L(b)/2 + e−L(b)/2
(15)
The sign of the LLR indicates the likely bit value, and the
LLR magnitude its reliability.
1) Estimate subkey likelihoods: To generate LLRs from
differential analysis, the reproduction property of the Gaussian
distribution is used: the estimation function of the mean
value of a Gaussian distribution with NT samples is again
Gaussian distributed, but with NT times smaller variance: Fig.
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Fig. 4. LLR distribution for correct subkey hypothesis of 1 bit length
and positive bit value, for different SNR and different number of traces.
Distribution for a wrong previous round key estimate also shown.
2 shows not only the conditional received values, but also the
estimation functions of the conditional mean values. If it is:
P(f |vi = +1) ∝ N (ǫ, σn) (16)
then the estimation function of the mean µp for positive vi is:
P(µp) ∝ N (ǫ, σn√
NT /2
) (17)
The likelihood of the mean value µp for positive vi being
larger than the mean value µn for negative vi can be approx-
imated as the Gaussian tail distribution:
P(µp > µz) ≈ Q( (µˆp − µˆz)/2
σˆµ
) (18)
where µˆp and µˆz are the conditional mean values computed
over the trace partitions, and σˆµ = σn√
NT /2
is the correspond-
ingly computed standard deviation of the estimation functions
(assuming equal partition sizes). The tail probability is illus-
trated in Fig. 3. Computation of this value can be implemented
as a table lookup of the Q-function. The likelihood of the
subkey hypothesis to be correct is the likelihood of µp being
larger than µz:
P(kS) = P(µp > µz) (19)
Thus, likelihoods can be generated for all possible subkey
hypotheses kS.
2) Compute key bit LLRs from subkey likelihoods: The
number and length of the subkey hypotheses depend on
selection function. For s bits length, there are 2s hypotheses.
Each of the i = 1 . . . s bit positions is contained with positive
bit value and negative bit value in 2s−1 hypotheses each. This
entails that there is always at least one hypothesis with positive
key bit value and one counterhypothesis with this bit being
negative. The key bit LLRs can be computed as:
L(bi) = log
∑
kS∈Si+
P(kS)∑
kS∈Si−
P(kS)
(20)
Fig. 5. M-algorithm: nodes are expanded into ME children, of which the
most likely MR per level are further evaluated (example ME = 5, MR = 3).
where Si+ denotes the set of all hypotheses where bit number
i has positive value, and Si− the set where it has negative
value.
To reduce the computational effort, the Max-Log approxi-
mation [19] can be used:
log
∑
i
ai ≈ max
(
log(ai)
)
(21)
which yields
L(bi) ≈ max
kS∈Si+
(
log P(kS)
)
− max
kS∈Si−
(
log P(kS)
)
(22)
Fig. 4 shows conditional LLR distributions for positive bit
value, for different SNR and different number of traces. It
also shows an LLR distribution for a wrong previous round
key. The improvement in expected LLR magnitude and classi-
fication accuracy with increasing SNR and increasing number
of traces is clearly visible.
3) Combining independent selection functions: If LLRs for
the same bit are generated from independent selection func-
tions, these LLRs are simply added for information combining.
Different subkey hypothesis lengths are no problem in this
formulation.
C. Sequential decoding: multi-round soft information combin-
ing
The proposed implementation uses the M-algorithm, which
is illustrated in Fig. 5. It is a breadth-first tree search with
deterministic limited complexity. Each node in a tree is reach-
able from the root with exactly one path. Visited nodes are
assigned the path metric, and in each tree level only the M-
best nodes (best path metrics) are expanded into the next level.
The algorithm finds the leaf with the ’approximately best’
metric, where the approximation is better for larger M. The
M-algorithm comprises the ’greedy’ heuristic for the special
case M=1.
1) Path metric: In order to find the MLSE solution for the
expanded key, the key bit sequence log-likelihood is chosen
as path metric. This is a computationally convenient choice
because the Max-Log approximation can also be applied to
the mapping from LLR to probability (Eq. (15)), e.g. [11]:
log(P(bi = −1)) = log 1
1 + eL(bi)
= log 1− log(e0 + eL(bi))
≈ 0−max(L(bi); 0) (23)
The Max-Log approximated log-likelihood of a sequence of
bits, e.g. a round key, then becomes:
log(P(b)) ≈
∑
i
L(bi) · bi (24)
Summands increase the sequence log-likelihood if both the L-
value and the bit have equal signs; otherwise they reduce it. Bit
positions contribute to the metric according to their reliability
(LLR magnitude). An overview of the proposed algorithm in
pseudo-code formulation is given in Alg. 1.
2) Node expansion: generate child round key candidate
set: This section describes the node expansion into its child
nodes. The child round key candidate set is generated from the
LLRs for the current round’s bit positions (which are obtained
according to Sec. IV-B). Since the round LLR generation needs
the data (cyphertext or plaintext) corresponding to the traces,
this can be directly applied only in the first round. For later
round i, the data first needs to be decrypted according to the
current candidate’s previous round keys ki−1...1 (conditional
decryption, Alg. 1). The children’s round metrics βR therefore
follow from Eq. (24) to:
βR(ki|ki−1...1) =
NB∑
j=1
L(ki,j |ki−1...1) · ki,j (25)
By design of the cryptographic algorithm, it is again unfeasible
to visit all child nodes even for a single node expansion. The
expansion into the Me ’best’ child nodes therefore again uses
a heuristic.
One possible heuristic to find the ’ME-best’ children of a
node is described in the following. It computes round metrics
βR for a search space of MS > ME candidate childs which
is determined as:
• sort conditional round LLRs L(ki,j |ki−1...1) according to
magnitude
• the most likely child is determined as the LLR signs
• the other MS − 1 child candidates are determined as bit
deviations from the most likely child:
– enumeration subspace: for the nE positions with
smallest LLR magnitude (most unreliable), all 2nE
bit combinations are enumerated
– combinatorial subspace: for the NB −nE remaining
bit positions, up to nC bit deviations are considered
– the search space is the Cartesian product of the enu-
meration subspace and the combinatorial subspace
• the MS metrics are computed
• the ME childs with best metric are returned.
A more detailed description of this node expansion heuristic
is listed as pseudo-code (similar to Octave/Matlab notation) in
Alg. 2.
3) Reduce candidate set with path metric: The number of
candidates on one tree level is then reduced to MR < ME
using the path metric βP :
βP (ki..1) = βR(ki|ki−1...1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
round log-likelihood
+ βP (ki−1..1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a-priori log-probability
(26)
The comment in the underbraces notes that the extension of
the path metric by one level is Bayesian updating (Eq. (13))
in the log domain when adding the new round’s information,
i.e. the a-posteriori log-probability is computed.
The reduction of the candidate set to MR candidates is
possible because the expected round LLRs are zero for any
wrong round key in the path candidate (compare Fig. 4). The
expected best child’s round metric is:
E
[
max
ki
βR(ki|ki−1...1)
]
=


NB ∗ E
[
|L(ki,j |ki−1...1)|
]
> 0 if ki−1...1 correct,
0 else
(27)
which gives a significant difference in the path metric values
for candidates which contain a false round key.
V. COMPLEXITY
The complexity measure of interest for application would be
the time complexity (number of clock cycles) on the hardware
available to run the algorithm. But this cycle count depends
on the instruction set architecture of the processor cores
used, and special hardware acceleration like with FPGAs is
possible. Therefore instead of assuming any special instruction
set, a high level complexity evaluation in dependence on the
parameters ME , MR, nE , nC , and R is given (assuming the
node expansion heuristic from Alg. 2).
a) Number of visited nodes:: one child expansion visits
MS candidates, with:
MS = 2
nE ·
nC∑
i=0
(
NB − nE
i
)
= 2nE ·
nC∑
i=0
(NB − nE)!
(NB − nE − i)! · i! (28)
ME candidates are returned for each expansion, and the tree
is pruned for each level to MR round survivors. The number
of visited nodes is therefore:
Nvisits = MS +MR ·MS · (R − 1) (29)
input : T traces and data
output: ’most likely’ expanded key candidate
// special treatment for round 1:
foreach Byte per round do
LLRs ← getLLRs (traces,data) ;
end
// get ME best round key candidates:
candidate [] ← getBestChilds (LLRs, ME) ;
// other rounds:
for round r ← 2 to NR do
foreach candidate do
rounddata ← roundDecrypt (data,
candidate);
foreach Byte per round do
LLRs = getLLRs (traces, rounddata) ;
end
end
/* compute path metrics, reduce to
MR candidates; */
candidate [] ← reduceCandidates (candidate
[], MR) ;
foreach candidate do
candidate [] ← getBestChilds (LLRs, ME)
end
end
return reduceCandidates (candidate [], 1) ;
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code overview of implementation
using M-algorithm, assuming byte-wise processing.
b) Metric computations:: in a straight-forward imple-
mentation, one complete metric would be computed per visited
node. But since the metric is additive over path segments (Eq.
(26)), the reuse of intermediate results is possible. And since
childrens’ round metrics are computed as sums of the same
LLRs with different signs (Eq. (25)), further reuse is possible
with a Gray code binary enumeration [21].
c) Compare/Select operations for candidate selection::
Child expansion needs to find the ME best values out of MS .
Round candidate reduction needs to find MR best out of ME
after the first round, and out of ME · MR later. Different
search algorithms like bubblesort or comb sort are possible,
but other algorithms like insertion sort may be preferable
for parallelization speedup on modern processors with SIMD
instructions. Again, a reuse may be possible with adequate
data structures.
d) Number of round decryptions:: after each round, MR
decryptions are needed, in sum:
Ndecrypt = MR · (R− 1) (30)
VI. ACCURACY
A simulative evaluation of the estimation accuracy is shown
in Fig. 6. The scenario assumes R = 10 rounds with
NB = 128 bit round key length, and a selection function
function Mbest ← getBestChildsApprox (LLRs,
ME , searchBitsEnum, numCorrectErrors) ;
input : round LLR vector conditioned on previous round
key path hypothesis
output: ME ’most likely’ round key candidates
numL ← length (LLRs) ;
/* sort according to reliability: */
[Lsorted, Lperm ] ← sort (LLRs, ’descend’) ;
bestCandidatePerm ← sign (LLRs) ;
sizeEnum ← 2searchBitsEnum ;
searchEnum ← de2bi(0:sizeEnum-1, ’left-msb’) ;
/* bit values ±1: */
zIdxs ← find (searchEnum == 0) ;
searchEnum (zIdxs) ← −1 ;
candCombIdxs ← cell(numCorrectErrors,1) ;
nCombSep (0) ← 1 ;
nComb ← nCombSep (0) ;
for i=1:numCorrectErrors do
candCombIdxs(i) ← nchoosek (1:128 -
searchBitsEnum,i) ;
nCombSep (i) ← nchoosek (128 -
searchBitsEnum,i) ;
nComb ← nComb + nCombSep (i) ;
end
numCand ← nComb ∗ 2searchBitsEnum ;
candCombBinary ← ones (numCand, numL) ;
pos ← 1 ;
for i ← 1:numCorrectErrors do
for j ← 1 : nCombSep (i-1) * sizeEnum do
pos ← pos + 1 ;
/* deviations from most likely
round candidate: */
candCombBinary (pos, candCombIdxs(i)(mod
(j,nCombSep (i))+1,:) ) ← -1 ;
candCombBinary (pos, numL-
searchBitsEnum + 1 : end) ← searchEnum
(mod (j,sizeEnum)+1,:) ;
end
end
rCandPerm ← bestCandidatePerm.*
candCombBinary;
/* compute metrics, get ME best: */
metrics ← ∑((rCandPerm.* kron (ones
(numCand,1),LSorted)).’) ;
[candMetr, candIdx ] ← sort (metrics,’descend’) ;
bestCandIdxsPerm ← candIdx (1:ME) ;
bestRCandBinPerm ← rCandPerm
(bestCandIdxsPerm,:) ;
/* unpermutate initial sorting: */
[dummy, unpermIdxs ] ← sort (Lperm, ’ascend’) ;
return Mbest ← bestRCandBinPerm (:,unpermIdxs) ;
Algorithm 2: Pseudo-code (similar to Octave / Matlab
notation [20]) to approximately find best ME child candi-
dates.
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Fig. 6. The proposed algorithm reduces the number of required traces
compared to the standard algorithm by a factor of two in a configuration
with reasonable complexity.
with subkey length of 1 bit. The proposed algorithm is run
with ME = 10000 and MR = 20 and compared for different
SNR with the standard single-round ’hard decision’ estimation
(which directly quantizes to the ML subkey hypotheses).
Simulation computes the expected number of required traces to
successfully estimate the secret key. The simulation results are
obtained with a scripting language on a single PC, which may
be seen as indication of a reasonable computation complexity.
Over the complete investigated SNR range, the proposed
algorithm reduces the required number of traces roughly by a
factor of two (corresponding to a 3dB SNR gain). Accuracy
can be further improved by increasing ME and MR.
VII. DISCUSSION
This paper describes approximative Bayesian inference for
side channel secret key estimation in the sense of MLSE.
The probabilistic formulation allows for optimal combination
of information, like from different key substring hypotheses,
different selection functions, and different processing rounds.
It allows to exploit redundancy in the expanded key of multi-
round cryptographic algorithms for soft-decision estimation
error correction. Computational effort is reduced by using
conditional independencies of variables, and scalable with
sequential decoding methods.
The example implementation using the M-algorithm in-
cludes standard differential analysis as one special case (for
ME = MR = 1 if subkey hypothesis length is one bit,
and using only one round) and has strictly better estimation
accuracy otherwise. For longer subkey hypothesis length the
proposed algorithm is more accurate due to probabilistic
combing of hypotheses likelihoods. It further performs better
if multiple rounds are considered, because intermediate errors
of early quantization are avoided and can be corrected over
the path metric. This higher accuracy comes at the price of
increased computational complexity.
Several modifications and extensions of the presented meth-
ods are possible. They could be combined with different side
channel analysis algorithms other than single-bit differential
analysis. Other sequential decoding implementations like the
stack algorithm or T-algorithm are applicable as well. It is fur-
ther possible to terminate early, i.e. not to follow all processing
rounds (some proposed Turbo Decoder implementations for
example use a stopping criterion based on LLR magnitudes).
The presented example implementation also did not yet en-
force structural constraints like the key expansion algorithm.
Pruning the code tree can be improved by considering only
valid expanded key sequences.
With sequential decoding, the side channel analysis prob-
lem becomes a 3-dimensional trade-off between measurement
SNR, number of required traces and computational complexity.
It becomes possible for example to use cheaper measurement
equipment (worse SNR) by computing a bit more, or to
a achieve a new minimum number of required traces by
investing high computational effort. Future work may consist
of further characterizing this trade-off by comparing algorithm
modifications and identifying Pareto-efficient ones.
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